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Abstract—Microgrids are self-sufficient small-scale power grid
systems that can employ renewable generation sources and
energy storage devices and can connect to the main grid or
operate in a stand-alone mode. Most research on energy-storage
management in microgrids does not take into account the
dynamic nature of the problem and the need for fully-distributed,
multi-step scheduling. First, we address these requirements by
extending our previously proposed multi-step cooperative dis-
tributed energy scheduling (CoDES) algorithm to include both
purchasing power from and selling the surplus power to the
main grid. Second, we model the microgrid as a multi-agent
system where the agents (e.g. households) act as players in a
cooperative game and employ a distributed algorithm based on
the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to fairly allocate the costs of
cooperative power management (computed using CoDES) among
themselves. The dependency of the day-ahead power schedule
and the costs on system parameters, e.g., the price schedule and
the user activity level (measured by whether it owns storage
and renewable generation devices), is analyzed for a three-agent
microgrid example.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microgrids support a flexible, reliable, and efficient integra-
tion of renewable sources of energy, such as solar and wind,
energy storage devices, and demand response [1], [2]. Dis-
tributed scheduling of microgrid power to optimize the overall
cost without utilizing a control center is vital to successful
microgrid management [3]. Most distributed power scheduling
methods in the literature on microgrids assume single-step
optimization and do not incorporate dynamic evolution of the
stored energy [1]–[6]. In [7], [8], we proposed a dynamic
multi-step cooperative distributed energy scheduling (CoDES)
algorithm where the energy storage devices in the microgrid
are scheduled to cooperatively minimize the overall cost of
purchasing power from the main grid. In this paper, the CoDES
method [7] is extended to include both purchasing power from
and selling power to the main grid.
The extended CoDES algorithm minimizes the overall, or
social, microgrid cost. To determine individual users’ costs,
we model a microgrid as a dynamic multi-agent system where
each agent (e.g., a household) can own distributed energy
storage devices (DESDs) and/or renewables and is associated
with an individual load profile. The agents act as players in a
cooperative game [5] and employ a computationally efficient
This work was partially supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation
under award EEC-0812121 and award CNS-1505633.
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [9] to fairly allocate the costs
of power provided by the grid. Game theory was utilized for
microgrid energy storage optimization in e.g., [4]–[6] while
cost allocation for power industry was addressed in [10]–[12]
as well as our recent work [13], [14]. However, the distribution
of costs of microgrid power management was not addressed
previously.
In the proposed NBS cost allocation algorithm, the optimal
social cost is found first using the extended CoDES method.
Then this total cost is distributed among the users according
to each user’s need for power provided by the main grid
as well as for cooperation. The proposed cost allocation
method reduces the users’ costs relative to stand-alone power
scheduling, thus enticing them to join in cooperative power
scheduling. A novel consensus-based [15] method is employed
to achieve the distributed cost allocation for all agents. Finally,
numerical results for a three-agent grid-connected microgrid
illustrate the effects of the variation of the power prices over
the 24-hour period and individual agents’ loads and resources
on the day-ahead optimal power schedule and the agents’
costs.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Development of a fully-distributed multi-step power
scheduling method that optimizes both purchasing power
from and selling the surplus power to the main grid.
• Design of a distributed fair cost allocation method for
multi-agent microgrids.
• Validation of practical relevance and computation effi-
ciency of proposed algorithms using a microgrid model
with heterogeneous loads and activity levels and time-
varying power prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the microgrid model and the distributed CoDES
method. In Section III, distributed NBS-based cost allocation
is derived for multi-agent microgrids. Section IV contains
numerical results and analysis, and Section V concludes the
paper.
II. THE MICROGRID MODEL AND COOPEARTIVE ENERGY
SCHEDULING
Consider an n-Bus microgrid system where the supply side
(Bus n) represents the main grid, and the demand side has r =
n−1 users, including both passive users, which own loads, and
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Fig. 1. An example of 3-user grid-connected microgrid system model
active users, which also own DESDs and/or renewable energy
generation units, e.g., rooftop PV panels or wind turbines. The
passive users are the energy consumers, i.e. they can only
purchase energy from the grid, while active users can also
sell their generated power to the main grid. Fig. 1 shows an
example of a 4-Bus system, where Bus 1 and Bus 3 belong
to active users, and Bus 2 belongs to a passive user. Table I
includes the notation frequently used in the paper.
TABLE I
NOTATION TABLE
Term Definition
Uact/Upas The sets of active/passive users
T Number of time steps for power scheduling
t Current time step
∆t Time interval between two time steps (hr)
pb(t)/ps(t) Prices at which the users purchase/sell power from/to
the grid
P+G (t) ≥ 0 Power purchased from the grid
P−G (t) ≥ 0 Power sold to the grid
PG(t) PG (t) = P
+
G (t)− P−G (t)
PmaxG The maximum power P
+
G (t)/P
−
G (t) that can be
purchased from or sold to the grid at any time step
Pi,D(t) The forecasted load demand power of the ith user
Pi,R(t) The renewable generation power of the ith user
Pi,B(t) The charging/discharging power command of the ith
user’s DESD
Pi(t) [P
+
G (t) P
−
G (t) Pi,B(t)]
′ is the vector of primal
variables of user i, i = 1, · · · , r
Pmini,B /P
max
i,B The charging and discharging lower/upper limits of
the ith user’s DESD power Pi,B(t)
Ei,B(t) The energy stored in the ith user’s DESD
E0i,B The initial energy stored in the i
th user’s DESD
Emini,B /E
max
i,B The lower/upper capacity limits of the i
th user’s
DESD energy Ei,B(t)
J The total bill
λ(t) The incremental cost
∆P (t) The global power imbalance
ωij The communication connectivity strength between
nodes i and j
Ni The set of neighbors of node i
A. Optimal Power Scheduling Problem
All demand-side users collaborate to minimize the total
electricity bill for the upcoming time interval of T time steps:
J = min
Pi(t),∀i
T∑
t=1
(
pb (t)P
+
G (t)− ps (t)P−G (t)
)
∆t. (1)
In (1), the cost is minimized by optimizing the microgrid
power schedule, which is subject to:
1) Power Balance Constraint: At any time step t, the amount
of load is equal to the amount of power generation:
n∑
i=1
Pi,D (t) =
n∑
i=1
(Pi,B (t) + Pi,R (t)) +
(
P+G (t)− P−G (t)
)
. (2)
where P+G (t) = 0 or P
−
G (t) = 0 for ∀t.
2) DESD Dynamics and Capacity Limits: The system states
are given by the values of the stored energy in DESDs Ei,B(t),
which satisfy
Ei,B(t+ 1) = Ei,B(t)− Pi,B(t)∆t,∀i ∈ Uact. (3)
From (3):
Ei,B(t) = E
0
i,B −
∑t
τ=1
Pi,B (τ)∆t, ∀i ∈ Uact. (4)
Thus, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ T and any i ∈ Uact:
E0i,B − Emaxi,B 6
∑t
τ=1
Pi,B (τ)∆t 6 E0i,B − Emini,B . (5)
B. Cooperative Distributed Energy Scheduling Algorithm
First, we formulate the augmented Lagrangian function for
the optimization (1) under the constraints (2), (5) and Table I:
L =
T∑
t=1
(
pb (t)P
+
G (t)− ps (t)P−G (t)
)
∆t+
T∑
t=1
λ (t) ∆P (t)
+
∑
i∈Uact
T∑
t=1
µ1i (t) ∆P1i (t) +
∑
i∈Uact
T∑
t=1
µ2i (t) ∆P2i (t)
+
ρ
2
T∑
t=1
∆P (t)
2
+
ρ
2
∑
i∈Uact
T∑
t=1
∆P1i(t)
2
+
ρ
2
∑
i∈Uact
T∑
t=1
∆P2i(t)
2
,
(6)
where λ(t), µ1i(t) and µ2i(t) are the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) multipliers [7], ρ is the penalty factor, and
∆P (t) =
∑n
i=1
Pi,D (t)−
(
P+G (t)− P−G (t)
)
−
∑
i∈Uact
(Pi,B (t) + Pi,R (t)),
(7)
∆P1i (t) =
[
E0i,B − Emaxi,B −
∑t
τ=1
Pi,B (τ)∆t
]+
, (8)
∆P2i (t) =
[
Emini,B − E0i,B +
∑t
τ=1
Pi,B (τ)∆t
]+
, (9)
where []+ projects its argument to its positive values.
By taking the gradient of L in (6) with respect to the primal
variables’ vector Pi(t) = [P+G (t) P
−
G (t) Pi,B(t)]
′ and the
dual variables’ vector Λi(t) = [λ(t) µ1i(t) µ2i(t)]′, we
obtain the update equations:
Pi
k+1(t) = Pi
k(t)− ξ1∇Pik(t)L, (10)
Λi
k+1(t) = Λi
k(t)− ξ2∇Λik(t)L, (11)
where ξ1, ξ2 are the vectors of update coefficients.
However, the equations (10), (11) require the global pa-
rameters λ(t) and ∆P (t), respectively, which is not available
locally to individual users. To make the computataion fully
2
distributed, the consensus algorithm is employed in each Bus
to compute the estimates of the global information λ̂i (t) and
∆P̂i(t) [7], [15], [16]:
λ̂k+1i (t) = λ̂
k
i (t) +
∑
j∈Ni ωij
(
λ̂kj (t)− λ̂ki (t)
)
+ ξ3∆P̂
k
i (t) , (12)
∆P̂ k+1i (t) = ∆P̂
k
i (t) + ∆P
k+1
i (t)−∆P ki (t)
+
∑
j∈Ni
ωij
(
∆P̂ kj (t)−∆P̂ ki (t)
)
,
(13)
where ωij is the entry (i, j) of a doubly-stochastic consensus
update matrix W, which represents the communication con-
nectivity strength [15] between the nodes i and j, Ni denotes
the set of neighbors of node i, and the local power imbalance
∆P k+1i (t) =

Pi,D (t) , i ∈ Upas
Pi,D (t)− P ki,B (t)− Pi,R (t) , i ∈ Uact
−
(
P
+(k)
G (t)− P−(k)G (t)
)
, i ∈ Grid
. (14)
By replacing λ(t) and ∆P (t) with their estimates λ̂i (t) and
∆P̂i(t), respectively, we obtain a fully-distributed algorithm,
which computes the optimal solution of the energy scheduling
problem and the optimal total cost J (1) of the microgrid T
time steps ahead.
III. THE MULTI-AGENT MICROGRID MODEL AND COST
ALLOCATION
The solution to (1) optimizes the total cost of the system
when all users cooperate on microgrid power scheduling.
However, it is necessary to allocate these costs among the
users. One possible cost distribution is based on the cost of
consumption, found by computing the total cost of the power
bought/sold by each agent in the optimization (1). However,
such costs do not represent a fair cost allocation since they
are chosen to minimize the social objective (1), which does
not necessarily reflect individual users’ power needs.
In this section, the microgrid is modeled as an r-agent sys-
tem connected to the main grid as illustrated in Fig. 1. Several
approaches to fair cost allocation for cooperative games have
been proposed in the literature [9], [17]–[19]. We employ
Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) due to its computational
efficiency [9]. The proposed cost allocation is unique and fair
as discussed below.
A. Overview of the Nash Barganing Solution (NBS)
Consider a system with r players and a system-wide cost
function J . The NBS cost allocation algorithm proceeds in
three steps [9]:
(1) The players cooperate to minimize the social cost J .
(2) The disagreement point is computed as D =
(D1, D2, · · · , Dr), where the selfish cost Di is the maximum
cost the ith player is willing to pay.
(3) The overall cost J is split among the players, with the
allocated cost of player i given by Theorem 2 in [9]:
Ji = Di −
∑r
i=1Di − J
r
∀i = 1, · · · , r. (15)
Note that bargaining is successful when the social cost is no
greater than the sum of the selfish costs, i.e.,
J ≤
∑r
i=1
Di, (16)
or equivalently, each player’s allocated cost does not exceed
its selfish cost:
 = Di − Ji ≥ 0, (17)
where  is the discount of cooperation, which is the same for
all players. Finally, note that by Theorem 2 in [9], the cost Ji
is the smallest achievable allocated cost of player i given J
and D in steps 1 and 2, respectively, thus resulting in a fair
cost allocation.
B. Cost allocation for Multi-Agent Microgrids
Next, NBS cost allocation is applied to the cooperative
power scheduling problem in Section II. First, the social cost
J is computed as in Section II-B using the CoDES algorithm.
Second, we find the disagreement point as follows. Each agent
computes its own selfish cost Di by ignoring all other players
and optimizing its power trading with the grid based on its
own load profile, energy storage parameters, and renewable
generation resources. For the ith agent, denote the power
drawn from and injected into the grid as P+i,G (t) and P
−
i,G (t),
respectively. Then the following constraints must be satisfied:
0 6 P+i,G (t) 6 PmaxG , 0 6 P−i,G (t) 6 PmaxG , (18)
and Pi,G(t) = P+i,G(t) − P−i,G(t). Similarly to (2), the power
balance for agent i = 1, · · · , r must be satisfied as:
Pi,D (t) = Pi,B (t) + Pi,R (t) +
(
P+i,G (t)− P−i,G (t)
)
. (19)
Finally, (5) must hold, and (18) and (19) also apply to passive
users (e.g. Agent 2 in Fig. 1) with Pi,B(t) = Pi,R(t) = 0.
Combine all power rating commands of the ith agent from
time step 1 to T into a vector Psi ∈ R3T×1:
Psi = [ P
+
i,G P
−
i,G Pi,B ]
′ (20)
where
P+i,G =
[
P+i,G (1) · · · P+i,G (T )
]
,
P−i,G =
[
P−i,G (1) · · · P−i,G (T )
]
,
Pi,B =
[
Pi,B (1) · · · Pi,B (T )
]
.
(21)
The selfish cost of agent i is calculated as:
Di = min
Psi
∑T
t=1
(
pb (t)P
+
i,G (t)− ps (t)P−i,G (t)
)
∆t. (22)
A positive Di indicates the largest cost agent i is willing to pay
for purchasing power from the main grid. If Di is negative,
the active agent i expects at least the profit −Di by selling its
generated power to the main grid.
For the upcoming time steps 1, · · · , T , define the price
vector p ∈ R1×2T and the demand and renewable generation
vectors of agent i as Pi,D ∈ R1×T and Pi,R ∈ R1×T ,
respectively:
3
p =
[
pb (1) · · · pb (T ) | −ps (1) · · · −ps (T )
]
,
Pi,D =
[
Pi,D (1) · · · Pi,D (T )
]
,
Pi,R =
[
Pi,R (1) · · · Pi,R (T )
]
.
(23)
Denote vector f =
[
p 01×T
]′
. Then the optimization (22)
can be expressed as a linear programming (LP) problem:
min
Psi
f ′Psi (24)
s.t. APsi 6 B, AeqPsi = Beq,
where A, B, Aeq and Beq are defined by the inequality and
equality constraints in (5), (18), (19) and Table I.
By solving the above LP problem, each agent computes its
own selfish cost Di = f ′Psi
∗. The allocated cost of agent
i is given by (15). Finally, note the set of selfish power
schedules computed using (22) for all agents is a suboptimal
solution of the social optimization (1), i.e. (16) must hold.
Thus, successful bargaining is guaranteed in our game.
C. Distributed Cost Allocation
In (15), each agent needs the knowledge of other players’
selfish costs to compute the sum
∑r
i=1Di. To avoid exchange
of these costs, we employ the averaging consensus algorithm
[15] where the agents and the grid communicate only with
their neighbors. Set the initial state of agent i to xi(0) = Di,
and set the grid’s initial state to xr+1(0) = −J . The state
update equation of each node i = 1, · · · , r + 1 is given by:
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
ωij (xj(k)− xi(k)), (25)
Provided the communication network is connected, the state
information xi(k) converges to the average of the initial states
[15]:
xˆi = lim
k→∞
xi(k) =
∑r+1
i=1 xi(0)
r + 1
=
∑r
i=1Di − J
r + 1
. (26)
Thus, at convergence, each agent is able to calculate its own
allocated cost Ji using only its local information:
Ji = Di − (r + 1)xˆi
r
, ∀i = 1, · · · , r (27)
which is equivalent to (15).TABLE II
DESD PARAMETERS
Agent E0i,B E
min
i,B E
max
i,B P
max
i,B
Agent 1 2.8kWh 2.8kWh 7kWh 3.3kW
Agent 3 2.8kWh 2.8kWh 10kWh 4.3kW
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We use the 4-Bus microgrid system model (3 agents and 1
grid) shown in Fig. 1 to validate the extended CoDES method
in Section II and the cost allocation approach in Section III.
Each agent owns a distributed controller, which executes the
proposed algorithms and exchanges state information with its
neighbors’ controllers via bidirectional communication links.
To protect the users’ data, the local information of each Bus,
including its renewable generation and power consumption, is
only accessible to the controller embedded in that Bus. The
demand profiles of all users and the renewable generation
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Fig. 2. System parameters over the 24 hours period. (a) Users’ power
demands; (b) Active users’ renewable generation; (c) The price profile.
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of active agents using the extended CoDES algorithm; (b) Grid power schedule
using the extended CoDES and the sum of all agents’ powers traded with the
grid at the disagreement point D (22); (c) Agents’ powers traded with the
grid at D.
of the active users are obtained from PJM database1. The
price pb(t) is obtained from the Duke Energy Progress, NC
residential service schedule tariff2, and ps(t) is set to 80%
of pb(t). The DESD parameters are listed in Table II. The
demand and renewable generation of the agents are shown in
Fig. 2(a,b), and the price profile is illustrated in Fig. 2(c). The
interval T = 24 steps, and ∆t = 1 hr.
Fig. 3 shows the optimal day-ahead schedules for the
proposed algorithms. In Fig. 3(a), the power commands to
the DESDs of the active users i=1,3 are illustrated for the
CoDES method while Fig. 3(b) shows the schedules of the
power traded with the grid for social optimization (1) and of
the combined powers of the selfish optimizations (22) of all
agents. Note that during the off-peak hours (1-11 hr, 21-24 hr),
when the price is relatively low, the active users tend to buy
power and charge the DESDs while they use the stored power
(discharge) or sell surplus generated power to the grid during
1http://pjm.com/markets-and-operations/energy/real-time/hourly-prelim-
loads.aspx
2https://www.duke-energy.com/pdfs/R3-NC-Schedule-R-TOU-dep.pdf
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the peak hours (14-18 hr), when the utility price is higher.
Moreover, Fig. 3(c) reveals significant differences in users’
power profiles that result from stand-alone power trading with
the grid in (22). We observe that the passive 2nd agent buys
power at a relatively constant rate to satisfy its demand while
the active users adapt to price variation by utilizing their
storage devices and renewable generation. In particular, the
3rd agent sells more power than it buys from the grid due
to its active renewable generation and large storage capacity
(Table II), despite its high power demand (Fig. 2(a)).
In Fig. 4, results of the cost allocation algorithm in Section
III-B are illustrated. From Fig. 4(a), we observe that eq. (16)
holds, confirming successful bargaining and savings of about
45¢ per day due to cooperation. In Fig. 4(b), we show the
selfish, allocated, and consumption costs of individual agents.
We observe that allocated costs Ji provide a fixed discount
 ≈ 15¢ (17) per user per day relative to the selfish costs
Di (22). Moreover, Agent 2 pays the most while Agent 3 is
compensated for selling its generated power to the grid, which
is consistent with its selfish power scheduling in Fig. 3(c). In
addition, it receives a cooperation profit  by providing its
stored power to other users.
Finally, we found that the CoDES algorithm in Section
II-B converged within 2000 iterations (6 seconds3) to the
schedule found by the optimal centralized algorithm for solv-
ing (1) using linear programming, which was implemented
using the MATLAB built-in function linprog.m. Moreover,
the distributed NBS method in Section III-C converged in
10 iterations (< 1 sec). The latter consensus-based algorithm
converges faster than the social optimization method because
its only purpose is to find the average (25) while the CoDES
algorithm also optimizes the power schedules of the agents.
V. CONCLUSION
Distributed cost optimization and allocation was investi-
gated for microgrids that contain energy storage and renewable
generation devices. First, we developed a fully-distributed
multi-step energy scheduling method that optimizes both pur-
chasing power from and selling surplus power to the main grid.
Second, we proposed a distributed NBS-based cost allocation
methods. Finally, we demonstrated practical relevance and fast
convergence of proposed algorithms using a microgrid model
3The experiments are run using MATLAB on a Dell OPTIPLEX 980 with
Windows 7 64-bit operating system, 2.93GHz i7 CPU and 8GB RAM.
with heterogeneous loads, activity levels, and time-varying
power prices.
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